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Technological discontinuities pose serious challenges to top managers’ attention. These discontinuities, which oftenoccur at the fringes of an industry, are usually driven by innovative and (often) venture capital-backed start-ups creating
new products and transforming existing industries in ways that are difficult for incumbent managers to understand against
the backdrop of their existing cognitive schemata. However, failing to appreciate and embrace successful technological
discontinuities might endanger incumbents’ very existence. Extending the attention-based view, we explore whether and
how interorganizational relationships guide top managers’ attention either to or away from technological discontinuities.
We propose that homophilous relationships (e.g., alliances with industry peers) should exhibit a negative relationship
with incumbents’ timely attention to technological discontinuities, whereas heterophilous relationships (e.g., with venture
capitalists as a result of coinvestments) should exhibit a positive relationship. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the status of
the partners strengthens the effect of homophilous and heterophilous relationships with the timely attention of top managers
to technological discontinuities. Based on a longitudinal study of the incumbents in four information and communications
technology industry sectors, we find that heterophilous ties through corporate venture capital (CVC), coinvesting with
high-status venture capital firms, exhibit a strong positive relationship with timely attention. CVC, when it connects
senior management to high-status venture capitalists through coinvestments, has a special role in directing top managers’
attention to technological discontinuities and ensuing business opportunities. Implications for the understanding of the role
of interorganizational ties as structural determinants of top managers’ attention are discussed.
Key words : attention; corporate venture capital; homophily; heterophily; status; technological discontinuity
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Introduction
Recent research highlights the important role of man-
agerial attention in developing effective organizational
responses to technological discontinuities (Barr 1998,
Barr et al. 1992, Eggers and Kaplan 2009, Kaplan
2008, Kaplan et al. 2003, Kaplan and Tripsas 2008,
Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, Virany et al. 1992). This
research suggests that a firm’s response to technological
discontinuities is shaped by how its senior managers
pay attention to and interpret technological change (Daft
and Weick 1984) and how they translate this cog-
nition into effective strategic action (Bourgeois and
Eisenhardt 1988). This research emphasizes that in times
of discontinuous change, top management’s attention
allocation processes are central to shaping a firm’s
effective response to new technological paradigms (Barr
et al. 1992, Eggers and Kaplan 2009, Kaplan 2008,
Ocasio 1997).
Previous studies have provided ample evidence that
senior management’s attention is important, but prior
research also suggests that addressing technological
discontinuities poses important cognitive challenges to
top managers’ attention systems. Top managers usu-
ally focus their attention on information from familiar
sources, such as their existing competition (Peteraf and
Shanley 1997, Porac et al. 1995) or existing alliance
partners. Given their time constraints, executives often
interpret information using existing heuristics, cogni-
tive frames, and knowledge categories based on past
experience (Barr 1998, Barr and Huff 1997, Barr et al.
1992, Leonard-Barton 1992, Levinthal and March 1993).
Although these information processing and sensemak-
ing approaches are efficient in times of incremental
change, when both the existing information sources and
the information that they provide are reliable, they often
fail in situations of discontinuous change. In these sit-
uations, knowledge pertaining to technological discon-
tinuities is often fundamentally different from existing
knowledge and does not fit neatly into existing cogni-
tive frames (Kaplan and Tripsas 2008). Technological
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discontinuities are fundamental shifts from one dominant
technology to another. These shifts frequently change
the fabric of the industry, the rules of competition,
and the identity of the industry’s participants. These
discontinuities often occur outside of an industry or
at its fringes (Christensen 1997, Henderson and Clark
1990), creating new products and business models that
are difficult to understand against the backdrop of exist-
ing business logic (Barnett and Pontikes 2008, Tripsas
and Gavetti 2000). These new models typically involve
a set of players that are not part of the networks in
which incumbent firms participate (Koka and Prescott
2008). However, failing to respond effectively to these
discontinuities may endanger the very existence of an
incumbent.
Prior research findings suggest that top management’s
attention allocation is a prerequisite to an effective
organizational response to technological discontinuities.
However, executives may fail to pay attention to these
changes because of their information processing systems
and cognitive frames. Thus, we are left with two related
questions: What factors might support or hamper top
management’s attention allocation to technological dis-
continuities? How can organizations construct effective
mechanisms to guide top managers’ attention to techno-
logical discontinuities?
In this paper, we extend the attention-based view of
the firm (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001; Ocasio 1997, 2011;
Ocasio and Joseph 2005) to theorize on the structural
determinants of top management’s attention. In partic-
ular, we focus on the external mechanisms that firms
employ to direct their top management’s attention to
technological discontinuities. We propose that various
types of interorganizational relationships have differing
effects on top management’s attention and, in particular,
that homophilous relationships with industry peers may
negatively affect timely attention to emerging technolog-
ical discontinuities, whereas heterophilous relationships
(e.g., relationships with prominent venture capitalists
(VCs)) may guide top management’s attention toward
emerging discontinuities. In line with the principle of the
structural distribution of attention (Ocasio 1997), interor-
ganizational relationships allow corporations to create a
strategic context in which top managers are exposed to
technological discontinuities. We further argue that the
effects of these external mechanisms are strengthened by
the status of the relationship partner.
We test our arguments on the role of homophilous
and heterophilous interorganizational ties and the role of
partners’ status in these ties in shaping management’s
attention to technological discontinuities using a sam-
ple of the largest U.S. corporations from four infor-
mation and communication technology industry sectors
between 1989 and 2000. Incumbents in these industries
faced two technological discontinuities, the Internet and
wireless, that profoundly altered their industry definition
and the rules of competitive rivalry. The emergence of
the Internet and wireless technologies (e.g., mobile tele-
phony and wireless local area networks (WLANs)) also
spawned a large number of new business opportunities
and subfields that required substantially different skills
and competencies than those that incumbents typically
had, sometimes blinding them to the potential gains
from competing in this arena. Constructing full alliance
and VC syndication networks to examine the effects of
homophilous and heterophilous interorganizational ties
and partner status in these two different networks, we
found support for a strong positive effect of partner
status in heterophilous ties. Homophilous ties through
alliances with industry peers do not have a clear negative
effect as predicted, but the effect of these relationships
appears to depend partially on partners’ attention to dis-
continuous opportunities.
Our study extends the attention-based view from an
examination of the structural determinants within the
organization to include also interorganizational relation-
ships. Our results suggest that corporations can direct
top management’s attention to technological discontinu-
ities by creating an appropriate external structural con-
text for a firm. We view interorganizational relationships
as a mechanism through which incumbents expose their
top management to important issues in the operating
environment, enabling them to overcome potential blind
spots in their attention allocation system.
We also contribute to research on technological dis-
continuities and change. Recent research has begun to
develop a cognitive perspective on technological change
and firms’ responses to this change (Kaplan and Tripsas
2008, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Our findings extend
prior research that has emphasized the importance of
attention to discontinuities by highlighting the need for a
deeper understanding of the circumstances under which
top managers pay attention to such discontinuities.
Our study also adds to the social network litera-
ture. There is a long-standing debate on which net-
work structures provide the most benefits to firms (Burt
1992, Coleman 1988, Lee 2007), but researchers have
only recently begun to explore the importance of net-
work composition in explaining a firm’s gains as a
result of the multitude of networks to which it is con-
nected (Lee 2008). We contribute to this literature by
distinguishing between relationships with homophilous
and heterophilous partners and by showing the dif-
fering effects of these relationships on top manage-
ment’s attention. In addition, we hypothesize and test
differing effects of partner status in homophilous and
heterophilous interorganizational relationships. Although
the high status of partners in heterophilous ties exhibits
a positive effect on top management’s timely attention
to discontinuities, the status of partners in homophilous
ties seems to have a different effect.
The results contribute to the emerging literature on
corporate venture capital (CVC), especially its role in
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corporate innovation activities. In CVC investments,
large corporations invest in start-ups alongside tradi-
tional VC firms (Gompers and Lerner 1998). These
investments are usually made with the intent of gain-
ing strategic benefits (e.g., learning about emerging new
technologies or business models) as well as financial
benefits (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a, b; Wadhwa and
Kotha 2006). CVC investments have frequently been
viewed as a window on technology or a technology
radar (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2006, Keil et al. 2008a,
Siegel et al. 1988) that helps to enhance the recogni-
tion of emerging technologies and related business mod-
els among CVC managers and senior executives. Prior
studies have shown that CVC investments are related
to increased innovation rates when measured through
patenting rates (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005b, Schildt
et al. 2005, Wadhwa and Kotha 2006). More recently,
research has highlighted the limits of direct knowledge
flows from ventures to the corporate parent (Dushnitsky
and Shaver 2009). Recent studies have also begun to
compare learning from CVC investments and other
forms of interorganizational relationships (Dushnitsky
and Lavie 2010, Keil et al. 2008b). We add to this stream
of research by emphasizing that the contribution of CVC
activities to corporate innovation might be less crucial
in transferring patentable knowledge to the corporate
parent than in directing top management’s attention to
important technological changes in the firm’s external
environment.
Technological Discontinuities and
Firm Attention
Incumbents and Technological Discontinuities
Technological change is often an incremental but cumu-
lative process that is punctuated by short revolution-
ary periods in the form of discontinuities (Tushman and
Anderson 1986). Some of these discontinuities represent
major technological shifts that are so significant that no
change in scale, efficiency, or design can keep exist-
ing technologies competitive (Anderson and Tushman
1990, Tushman and Anderson 1986). Faced with such
discontinuities, some incumbents fail to adapt effectively
to these changes, leading to erosion of their market
positions (Henderson 1993, Henderson and Clark 1990,
Hill and Rothaermel 2003, Rosenbloom and Christensen
1994, Tushman and Anderson 1986).
There is agreement that incumbents encounter seri-
ous difficulties in adapting to technological discontinu-
ities, but the reasons behind these difficulties remain a
subject of debate. These reasons may include the dif-
ferent economic incentives of new entrants and incum-
bents in pursuing discontinuous innovation (Christensen
1997); forces of inertia, such as organizational iden-
tity (Tripsas 2009), path dependency, escalation of com-
mitment, and irreversible commitments (Henderson and
Clark 1990, Tushman and Anderson 1986); existing
organizational routines and capabilities that lead to
suboptimal responses to radical shifts (Levinthal and
March 1993, Nelson and Winter 1982); cognitive
barriers in noticing or interpreting new technologies
(Danneels 2011, Gilbert 2005, Leonard-Barton 1992);
and the embeddedness of incumbents within established
industry networks that do not initially value the new
technology (Rosenbloom and Christensen 1994).
Recent explanations of incumbents’ difficulties in
recognizing and responding to technological disconti-
nuities underscore senior management’s attention as a
key explanatory variable (Barr 1998, Cho and Hambrick
2006, Kaplan 2008, Kaplan et al. 2003, Kaplan and
Tripsas 2008, Ocasio 1997). For instance, in a series of
studies, Kaplan and her colleagues (Eggers and Kaplan
2009, Kaplan 2008, Kaplan et al. 2003) found that
incumbents whose chief executive officers (CEOs) or
top management teams paid timely attention to emerging
technological discontinuities were more likely to invest
in new technology and to produce effective responses
to emerging competitive threats. Although these studies
establish a clear link between senior managers’ atten-
tion to discontinuities and their effective firm response,
they leave a question unanswered: Why do senior man-
agers in some incumbent firms pay attention to these
discontinuities, whereas others do not? In other words,
what are the factors that influence senior managers’
attention allocation to emerging technological discon-
tinuities? Insights into these issues can be gained by
applying the attention-based view of the firm, developed
by Ocasio (1997) and discussed in the next section.
Managerial Attention to Discontinuities
Drawing on the Carnegie School, particularly the work
of Herbert Simon (Simon 1947), Ocasio (1997) sug-
gests that the structuring of attention in organizations
is one of the central explanations of firms’ behavior.
Organizational attention is defined as “the distinct focus
of time and effort by the firm on a particular set of
issues, problems, opportunities, and threats and on a par-
ticular set of skills, routines, programs, projects, and
procedures” (Ocasio 1997, p. 188). From this perspec-
tive, organizations function as systems of procedural and
communicational channels that receive issues and possi-
ble responses to these issues from the environment and
feed this information to decision makers for processing
(Ocasio 1997, Vissa et al. 2010). The decision outcomes
are therefore not determined solely by the characteristics
of the decision makers but are shaped by the specific
organizational context and the situations of individual
decision makers (Ocasio 1997, p. 189). Ocasio (1997)
identifies three principles that underlie the attention-
based view: (1) managerial action is usually focused on
the issues to which managers pay attention; (2) attention
is situated, meaning that the context in which decision
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makers are embedded affects their attention and the out-
comes of their decisions; and (3) attention is structurally
distributed—that is, the context in which decision mak-
ers find themselves depends on how organizations struc-
turally distribute and control the allocation of issues,
answers, and decision makers.
To understand why senior managers may pay attention
to technological discontinuities, it is particularly impor-
tant to understand the structural determinants of atten-
tion. Ocasio (1997) proposes that the rules of the game,
resources, players, and social positions within a firm
combine to determine the legitimacy, importance, and
relevance of issues and possible organizational responses
to these issues. The rules of the game usually reflect
the formal and informal principles of action, interaction,
and interpretation upon which decision makers draw in
accomplishing their tasks (Ocasio 1997). In the face
of technological discontinuities, existing rules of the
game can become counterproductive because they may
filter information about a given discontinuity, thereby
limiting top management’s attention to that discontinu-
ity (Leonard-Barton 1992, Levinthal and March 1993).
Similarly, existing resources may bias the attention of
decision makers toward response repertoires that build
upon these existing resources (Leonard-Barton 1992,
Levinthal and March 1993).
In addition to the rules of the game and resources,
the role of players and structural positions as structural
determinants of attention allocation are important in
understanding firms’ responses to discontinuities. Play-
ers refer to individuals and groups within or outside
an organization that influence decision makers. To date,
research on the role of different players has focused
largely on the CEO and other top management team
members and their role in shaping organizational atten-
tion (Cho and Hambrick 2006, Eggers and Kaplan 2009,
Hambrick and Mason 1984, Kaplan 2008, Kaplan et al.
2003, Yadav et al. 2007) and firms’ responses to emerg-
ing issues. For instance, Cho and Hambrick (2006) show
that top management teams’ demographics influence
firms’ attention to industry deregulation and that this
change in attention allocation leads to changes in com-
pany strategy. Similarly, Yadav et al. (2007) show that
the future orientation of a firm’s CEO is a predictor of
that firm’s speed in responding to technological change.
Closely related to the concept of players is the struc-
tural position of decision makers and other players in
the corporation. The distribution of structural positions
shapes attention patterns by providing decision makers
and other players with interests, values, and identities
that guide their attention to different aspects of the orga-
nization’s environment (Ocasio 1997). For instance, in
the context of attention to subsidiary issues, Bouquet and
Birkinshaw (2008) find that the structural position of a
subsidiary within the network of subsidiaries, measured
through the attractiveness of its market and its strengths
compared to other subsidiaries, is an important predictor
of the attention a subsidiary receives from the parent
multinational corporation.
Taken together, these studies have greatly enriched
our understanding of how the characteristics of players,
such as the composition of the top management team
or the CEO’s future orientation, influence their attention
allocation patterns. Yet the focus of these prior studies
has been on players and structural positions that exist
within the boundaries of the firm. However, attention
patterns in organizations are also influenced by players
outside the firm’s boundaries (Ocasio 1997); the influ-
ence of these players on attention patterns has received
relatively little recognition in the literature. Furthermore,
structural positions, such as status, may shape attention
patterns and guide decision makers’ attention to differ-
ent aspects of the environment (Ocasio 1997). In the
following sections, we will develop hypotheses about
how players external to a firm influence attention allo-
cation patterns within the firm, and we will empirically
test these hypotheses. In particular, we will focus on
the effects of heterophilous versus homophilous interor-
ganizational partners (types of players) and their status
(structural position) as structural antecedents of top man-
agement’s attention to technological discontinuities.
Interorganizational Relationships and
Managerial Attention
Interorganizational relationships constitute an important
communication channel through which organizations
and their decision makers interact with different players
in a firm’s external environment. Social network liter-
ature points out that through these interorganizational
relationships, firms receive important information about
events in their external environment and their potential
implications for the firm (e.g., Koka and Prescott 2008,
Lee 2007). Interorganizational relationships can help to
reduce a firm’s uncertainty about the nature of busi-
ness opportunities by giving the firm’s decision makers
access to different external information sources (Burt
1992, Granovetter 1973).
We expect interorganizational relationships to play
a particularly important role in guiding attention
related to technological discontinuities. As noted, these
discontinuities often emerge at the fringes of an industry,
outside the normal focus of attention of incumbents’
senior decision makers (e.g., Tripsas 1997). These dis-
continuities often draw upon radically new knowledge
or require operating and organizing principles that are
not easily comprehended within industries’ existing
cognitive frameworks. The fact that these discontinu-
ities involve a high degree of market and technolog-
ical uncertainty makes the evaluation of their likely
impact on incumbents’ businesses exceedingly challeng-
ing. The uncertainty that surrounds these discontinu-
ities may even lead some decision makers to ignore
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them. Interorganizational relationships can reduce the
perceived uncertainty (Lee 2007) of these discontinu-
ities, drawing attention to them and even shaping senior
executives’ attention to these discontinuities. In situa-
tions of high uncertainty, decision makers’ perceptions
of the quality of information received through interorga-
nizational relationships is often shaped by the status of
the source.
However, research also suggests that network bene-
fits do not occur under all circumstances. Interorganiza-
tional networks may even become a liability when the
nature of these networks is not aligned with the infor-
mation needs of the focal firm (Gargiulo and Benassi
2000, Koka and Prescott 2008). For instance, research
on social networks suggests that individuals and organi-
zations exhibit a tendency toward homophily (Luo and
Deng 2009, McPherson et al. 2001), defined as the ten-
dency to associate with similar others and to trust their
advice (McDonald et al. 2008). Such homophilous net-
work contacts may hold similar views (McDonald et al.
2008) and may not possess sufficiently dissimilar infor-
mation to help steer attention allocation patterns away
from routine processing in light of high uncertainty, or
they may even have incentives to direct attention away
from emerging discontinuities. In the next section, we
develop hypotheses for different types of interorgani-
zational relationships and their potential impact on the
timely attention to discontinuous business opportunities
in incumbent firms.
Homophilous Relationships with Industry Peers and
Top Management’s Attention to Discontinuities
One set of interorganizational relationships that may
shape the attention allocation of incumbents’ top man-
agers are links that these firms establish with other
incumbent firms in the same industry. Incumbents fre-
quently form close alliances with other incumbents to
extend supplier relationships and customer relationships
or to create horizontal cooperation. In their alliances
with industry peers, incumbents cooperate on a broad set
of issues that include early stage research, technology
standardization, and manufacturing as well as joint go-
to-market strategies or joint marketing. Although these
relationships have diverse purposes, they are character-
ized by intense business development activities and fre-
quent information exchange (Dyer and Singh 1998). For
instance, in a research and development (R&D) alliance,
firms may jointly develop new technology and, in the
process, exchange detailed information about technolog-
ical trends. Furthermore, in alliances with customers or
suppliers, information about technological developments
is frequently exchanged to align roadmaps (Heide and
Miner 1992). Even in less technology-oriented relation-
ships, such as manufacturing or marketing relationships,
partners may exchange information about market trends
that influence joint understanding of technological shifts
(Hagedoorn 1993).
Alliance relationships with industry peers are charac-
terized by a high level of homophily because firms in the
same industry frequently share a large number of simi-
larities in their organizational forms, knowledge, experi-
ences, and mental frameworks (Porac et al. 1989, Porac
et al. 1995, Prahalad and Bettis 1986). Even within an
industry, firms frequently form links with relatively sim-
ilar partners (Luo and Deng 2009). Similarity among
alliance partners may make it easy to absorb information
from a partner (Lane and Lubatkin 1998) and may pro-
vide organizational decision makers with psychological
comfort when assessing information from these famil-
iar sources (McDonald et al. 2008), but homophilous
relationships may also direct top management’s atten-
tion away from technological discontinuities for several
reasons.
First, industry peers and the focal firm may have rel-
atively similar knowledge and information. Given that
discontinuous technological change often arises outside
of the industry or, at least, at its fringes (Christensen
1997, Henderson and Clark 1990) and frequently builds
on knowledge that is new to the industry (Kaplan and
Tripsas 2008), peer incumbents are less likely to be good
sources of knowledge and information about emerging
technological discontinuities.
Second, because firms in the same industry often
show striking similarities in their definitions of com-
petitors, operating principles, and technologies (Bettis
and Prahalad 1995; Porac et al. 1989, 1995), a peer
incumbent’s views on emerging discontinuities are likely
to resemble those held inside the focal firm and are
therefore unlikely to guide incumbent decision makers’
attention toward technological discontinuities; instead,
inertial forces within the incumbent firm may be
cemented. In line with this reasoning, Koka and Prescott
(2008) argue that dramatic changes in the environment
often modify the existing bases of competition, and firms
that are centrally positioned in existing industry net-
works are likely to be adversely affected by this shift
because the information they gain from their existing
ties may lose relevance after a change.
Third, even if incumbents have information about dis-
continuities and recognize the value of this information,
they may not have an incentive to share this information
with a within-industry peer. Incumbents’ alliance part-
ners are likely to have a considerable stake in existing
technologies and may be equally threatened by a discon-
tinuity. Thus, they may use these alliance relationships to
influence peers against adopting a technological solution
that could threaten both the focal firm and its partner.
Finally, the nature of the relationship with peer
incumbents may bias management’s attention to rou-
tine business development issues. Managing ongoing
alliance relationships often requires substantial time and
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managerial attention. Thus, most of these relationships
are dominated by routine business development issues
that will be relatively comfortable for managers in the
focal firm given the similarity of the alliance part-
ner. Thus, alliances with peers may further direct and
even bias top management’s attention to relatively rou-
tine business development issues rather than promoting
mindful interpretation of weak signals that are related to
emerging technological discontinuities (Salvato 2009).
Thus, we hypothesize as follows.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The larger the number of homo-
philous interorganizational ties to industry peers, the
later the time at which top management will pay atten-
tion to emerging discontinuous technological change.
Status, Homophily, and Top Management’s
Attention to Discontinuities
We expect the negative relationship of homophilous rela-
tionships to industry peers and the timely attention of
top management to technological discontinuities to be
further strengthened if these relationships are developed
with high-status partners (Podolny 2005). The status of
a player in an industry can be defined as the posi-
tion it occupies in the social hierarchy (Podolny 2005).
Contrary to a firm’s reputation, which directly reflects
past behavior (Fombrun and Shanley 1990), status is a
reflection of the patterns of relations and affiliations in
which a firm is engaged. High-status firms are incum-
bents that have developed a central position in the social
network of an industry over time. We expect status to
strengthen the effects of homophily through two interre-
lated mechanisms.
First, given how status accrues over time, high-status
industry peers are less likely to be engaged in or hold
information about technological discontinuities com-
pared with lower-status industry peers. Firms gain status
by being selective in their interactions with others and
by focusing on relationships with other high-status firms
in an industry at the expense of relationships with more
peripheral firms (Podolny 1993). As we have argued,
technological discontinuities often emerge at the fringes
or outside of an industry and are frequently created by
completely new firms that have no status in the indus-
try. Therefore, the strategies used by high-status firms
to maintain their status may limit their ability to inter-
act with firms that pursue technological discontinuities.
Given that high-status industry peers are less likely to be
involved in inducing technological discontinuities, these
firms will likely influence top managers’ attention pat-
terns toward the incremental developments of existing
technologies.
High-status firms are not only less likely to engage
in and hold information on technological discontinuities
but the focal firm’s top management will also attach a
particularly high weight to information from high-status
incumbent peers. In assessing information from differ-
ent external sources, top managers must simultaneously
evaluate both the information and the quality of the
source of information. Research on social networks sug-
gests that in such situations, the status of the actor is
frequently used as a signal for the quality of the actor
and, by extension, for the quality of their information
(Podolny 1993, 1994; Podolny 2001). Because managers
face a high level of uncertainty about the ability of a
partner to provide high-quality information about emerg-
ing discontinuity, they revert to the general assessment
of that partner by industry peers that is reflected in its
industry status. For instance, members of the top man-
agement team are more likely to give greater weight to
information from IBM, Microsoft, or Hewlett-Packard—
all high-status firms in the industries we studied—than
from a marginal firm or a newcomer to the industry.
In light of emerging technological discontinuities,
high-status firms may utilize the weight that others
(peers) attach to their knowledge and information to
shape technological trends in their favor by actively
influencing attention patterns among suppliers, cus-
tomers, and horizontal alliance partners. For instance, in
the early 2000s, incumbent telecommunications infras-
tructure companies were highly invested in cellular
technology for wireless data transmission. When sev-
eral alternative wireless data technologies were pro-
posed by relative newcomers to the industry, one of the
responses by high-status incumbents was to downplay
the importance of these technologies in their official
communications.
Taken together, the above observations lead us to pro-
pose that high-status industry peers may be less likely
to hold information on technological discontinuities and
may have a particularly strong influence in drawing focal
firm’s attention toward incremental technological devel-
opments. Therefore, we hypothesize as follows.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The higher a partner’s status in
homophilous interorganizational ties, the later the time
at which top management will pay attention to emerging
discontinuous technological change.
Heterophilous Interorganizational Relationships
with VCs and Attention to Discontinuities
Although homophilous interorganizational relationships
with industry peers may be a source of inertia in
managers’ attention allocation to technological discon-
tinuities, we expect that relationships with firms that
exhibit heterogeneity from an incumbent would facili-
tate top management’s attention to discontinuities. By
forming heterophilous interorganizational relationships,
an incumbent may be able to gain access to more diverse
information and diverging viewpoints that can help to
reshape attention patterns within the incumbent. Some
heterophilous relationships may further create external
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structures that are particularly geared to focusing top
management’s attention on nonroutine events and thus
improving attention quality (Rerup 2009, Salvato 2009).
Our study focuses on one specific set of relation-
ships that incumbents form by coinvesting with VCs
when making CVC investments (Dushnitsky and Lenox
2005a) in start-ups. In CVC investments, large corpora-
tions invest in start-ups alongside traditional VC firms
(Gompers and Lerner 1998), usually aiming to gain both
financial and strategic benefits, such as knowledge about
emerging technologies or business models (Dushnitsky
and Lenox 2005a, b; Wadhwa and Kotha 2006). CVC
investments directly connect the incumbent to start-ups
that focus on exploiting a technological discontinuity.
Start-ups are likely to have very different knowledge
and may use very different cognitive frameworks to
evaluate emerging technological discontinuity than focal
incumbents. For instance, by interacting regularly with
start-ups through board memberships, incumbent man-
agers may develop a deeper understanding of emerging
discontinuity.
CVC investments also connect the incumbent to other
VCs that invest in these ventures because most incum-
bents coinvest alongside multiple VCs in so-called syn-
dicated investments. Syndication enables VCs to share
risks (Wilson 1968) and exchange information about a
start-up’s management and technologies (Lerner 1994).
By investing in syndicates with traditional VCs, incum-
bents gain access to a community of investors that
specialize in assessing nascent technologies and spot-
ting emerging discontinuities. Given that VCs frequently
share information about the ventures they consider dur-
ing syndication, access to VCs provides high-quality
information about new ventures and discontinuous tech-
nologies they may pursue. Access to the VC community
may be valuable beyond the individual venture being
considered because senior managers may gain the oppor-
tunity to regularly exchange information with VCs about
the broader evolution of technologies and emerging busi-
ness subfields. In addition to holding different infor-
mation and possessing different cognitive frameworks
to evaluate technological discontinuities, VCs are more
likely to draw management’s attention to emerging dis-
continuities than their peer incumbents are. VCs have
no (or, at least, less) vested interest in existing technolo-
gies. Instead, they may have incentives to actively sup-
port emerging discontinuities to support the businesses
in which they invest. Therefore, VCs may share infor-
mation about and draw incumbent managers’ attention
to potential technological discontinuities.
Creating a mechanism to regularly focus on iden-
tifying potential discontinuities is important for the
quality of attention to discontinuities. Firms usually
face a trade-off between strong attentional engagement
(Ocasio 2011) to few issues (by focusing their cognitive
resources on a selected set of stimuli over a period of
time and thus improving the quality of their attention to
these stimuli; see Rerup 2009, Weick and Sutcliffe 2006)
and emphasizing the deliberate management of nonrou-
tine events through mindful exploration of a larger num-
ber of issues by the top management team (Ocasio 2011,
Salvato 2009). Given the prevalence and short-term pres-
sures of ongoing business development, top manage-
ment teams may emphasize a smaller number of issues,
and ongoing routine business development may crowd
out the exploration of emerging discontinuities. Given
that discussions with VCs typically focus on nonroutine
events and are largely free of the short-term pressures
of routine business development, frequent interactions
between VCs and top managers may create a mecha-
nism that routinizes the mindful exploration of weak
signals and allow incumbents to overcome the trade-off
between routine and mindful behavior (Levinthal and
Rerup 2006, Salvato 2009). This mechanism can expe-
dite incumbents’ recognition of technological disconti-
nuities. Therefore, we hypothesize as follows.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The larger the number of het-
erophilous interorganizational ties with VCs, the earlier
top management will pay attention to emerging discon-
tinuous technological change.
Bridging to Networks of High-Status VCs: Status,
Heterophily, and Attention to Discontinuities
Heterophilous interorganizational relationships created
through CVC investments connect incumbents to emerg-
ing communities of firms that focus on commercial-
izing technological discontinuities, particularly the VC
investors who finance these new firms. In this way,
incumbent managers may regularly be exposed to diverse
types of information and divergent views about emerg-
ing technological discontinuities. However, to ensure a
lasting impact on top management’s attention patterns, it
is important that the information about the technological
discontinuity and its source is credible. In heterophilous
relationships, incumbent managers usually interact with
highly dissimilar partners, which may make it difficult to
assess the trustworthiness of information received from
these sources (Luo and Deng 2009, McDonald et al.
2008, McPherson et al. 2001). For instance, top man-
agers are unlikely to be easily convinced by the state-
ments of a start-up manager or an unknown VC investor.
In heterophilous relationships, there is a risk that such
information is available but managers may opt to ignore
it because of uncertainty about the quality of informa-
tion and the credibility of its source. The social network
literature (Podolny 2005) suggests that in heterophilous
relationships, the status of the partner plays a critical role
in alleviating this uncertainty and in strengthening the
effect of heterophilous ties.
In particular, for CVC investments coinvested with
VCs, we expect that the status of the other VC investors
with whom an incumbent coinvests is critical in guiding
top management’s attention to emerging technological
discontinuities. The new ventures in which an incumbent
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invests typically have a very limited track record, mak-
ing it difficult to form status differentials. However, VCs
who coinvest with the incumbent are widely considered
experts on emerging technological discontinuities and
start-ups, and they usually have well-established track
records on which to form status assessments. In fact,
the VC industry is one of the most frequently cited
examples of environments where large status differences
exist between VC companies, such as Kleiner Perkins
Caulfield & Byers, Sequoia Capital, and Draper Fisher
Jurvetson, and more peripheral investors (Podolny and
Castelluci 1999). Confronted with uncertainty, incum-
bent firms’ senior managers are likely to revert to the
status of the VC firm when evaluating the information
received from VC sources. Thus, information obtained
from a high-status VC company is more likely to influ-
ence senior management’s judgments on the importance
of a technological discontinuity than information from
less centrally placed players.
Contrary to peer incumbent networks, in which we
expected centrally positioned high-status peers to have
less information about emerging discontinuities, we
expect the opposite in VC networks. VC firms are deeply
involved in commercializing technological discontinu-
ities because these discontinuities have high value cre-
ation potential (von Burg and Kenney 2000). The
literature on VC syndication also suggests that these cen-
trally positioned VCs usually possess information advan-
tages over VCs that are more peripherally positioned
(e.g., Freeman 1999, Hochberg et al. 2007, Hochberg
et al. 2010, Sorenson and Stuart 2001). Knowledge about
the quality of the start-up firms in which VCs invest is
scarce. To gain confidence in the quality of a start-up
and the technology it seeks to commercialize, VCs must
probe and cross-check several sources of information
about these technologies and their developers. This due
diligence process becomes extremely difficult when the
VC holds a peripheral position in the network. In con-
trast, VCs that are centrally located in a network can
tap into the knowledge of multiple partners, compare
their information, and make reasonable inferences about
the quality of the technology and its future trajectory
(Greve 2009, Powell et al. 1996). To protect their sta-
tus and trade secrets, centrally positioned VCs typically
syndicate predominantly with other centrally positioned
VCs (Hochberg et al. 2007) or with corporate investors
that possess complementary resources that compensate
for their lack of status in the VC community (Keil et al.
2010). As a result of this network dynamic, high-status
VCs may not only have more influence on top manage-
ment’s attention allocation but may also give managers
superior information about the likely impact of emerging
technological discontinuities. Therefore, we hypothesize
as follows.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The higher the status of the part-
ners in heterophilous interorganizational ties, the earlier
top management will pay attention to emerging discon-
tinuous technological change.
Methods
Empirical Setting
To test our hypotheses on the role of different types
of interorganizational ties as structural antecedents of
top management’s attention to emerging technological
discontinuities, we collected longitudinal data from the
largest companies (U.S.-based companies that are pub-
licly traded in U.S. stock exchanges with revenues above
200 million U.S. dollars in 1989) in four informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICT) industries
covering the three-digit Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC) codes 357 (computer and office equipment),
366 (communications equipment), 367 (electronic com-
ponents and accessories), and 737 (computer program-
ming, data processing and other computer-related ser-
vices) for the period 1989–2000. To prevent survivor
bias, we applied the selection criteria at the beginning
of the sample period and followed the companies to the
end of the sample period or until they were acquired
or ceased operations. This created an unbalanced panel
data set.
We focused on the 1989–2000 period, which wit-
nessed the rise of the Internet and wireless technolo-
gies (Mowery and Simcoe 2002, Szulanski et al. 2004).
At the beginning of the sample period (the beginning
of the 1990s), the Internet as a business phenomenon
was still unheard of, and wireless technologies were in
their infancy. However, new start-ups began to explore
the field in the early 1990s. Around 1994, some lead-
ing VCs, such as Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers,
began actively investing in the Internet by funding rev-
olutionary start-up companies such as Netscape and
Amazon.com. Wireless technologies, such as WLAN,
also became important, and VC-backed companies
played a significant role in this discontinuity. Overall,
there were major technological discontinuities, and wire-
less and Internet businesses started emerging in the mid-
dle of our sample period.
There is significant variance in the timing and the level
of attention paid by the top management of the com-
panies we studied to these discontinuities. Some of the
first incumbents in the sample mentioned the Internet in
their annual reports or 10-K filings in 1993–1995, but
most did so much later, between 1996 and 2000. For
instance, Microsoft introduced its first Internet browser
and mentioned the Internet for the first time in its letter
to shareholders in fall 1995, and the Internet was broadly
covered in subsequent letters to shareholders. In fact,
in the letter to shareholders in its 1995 annual report,
Microsoft declared, “The largest launch in the history of
the PC business, Windows 95 also launches the personal
computer in a new role as a platform for the Internet
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and the world of interactive networks” (Gates 1995).
Formal attention to wireless technologies followed a
similar pattern. Our sample companies were generally
active in different types of interorganizational networks
that included alliances and syndicated VC investments.
Approximately 40% of the active sample companies had
coinvestment ties with VCs.
We gathered data on alliances and joint ventures from
Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum database. Following
the social network literature (Stuart 1998, Stuart et al.
1999) in constructing partner status measures based on
alliance network positions, we collected information on
all alliances between all companies in SDC Platinum
to construct full alliance networks without being con-
strained by our focal partners and their immediate part-
ners. This process resulted in 250,462 alliance ties in
1989–2000. Following the literature on CVC and VC
syndication (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a; Dushnitsky
and Shaver 2009; Podolny 2001; Sorenson and Stuart
2001, 2008), we used the VentureXpert database to iden-
tify incumbents’ CVC investments. Again, we wanted to
use full syndication networks when calculating partner
status measures. We downloaded information on 139,478
VC investments covering the 1989–2000 period. For the
dependent variables, we collected 10-K filings from the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and sev-
eral alternative sources (e.g., LexisNexis, Mergent) for
those firm-year observations for which the 10-K docu-
ment was not available in the SEC EDGAR service. We
also collected annual reports for all available firm-year
observations using a large number of sources, including
databases of Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, Mergent,
and company websites. In many cases, annual reports
were available only as images. In those cases, we scanned
the documents and reproduced the texts of the letters
to shareholders with the aid of optical character recog-
nition software, after which the documents were manu-
ally inspected and corrected where necessary. Finally, we
used Compustat as the source for our financial control
variables.
Research Design
We employed both event history analysis techniques and
fixed effects panel regression models in analyzing the
effects of interorganizational relationships on the tim-
ing of top management’s attention to technological dis-
continuities. Event history models are well suited for
our purpose because our data are right censored for all
firms that did not formally pay attention to technological
discontinuities before they were acquired, before they
ceased to exist because of a bankruptcy, or before the
end of the analysis period. The hazard models employed
in event history analyses, reported later, explicitly con-
sidered such censoring.
When specifying the hazard model, one can choose
from several parametric models or a semiparametric
model (Hosmer et al. 2008). The semiparametric Cox
model has the advantage of not making strong assump-
tions about the baseline hazards function. This is impor-
tant because incorrect parametric assumptions may yield
biased estimates of the effects of covariates on the
hazard rate (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). We analyzed
the data using the Cox regression model (Cox 1972),
a common choice for analyzing time-to-event data in
analogous settings (e.g., Eggers and Kaplan 2009). The
formal Cox hazards regression model is
h4t5= h04t5 exp8′X4t591
where h04t5 is the unspecified baseline hazards function,
 is a vector of regression coefficients to be estimated,
and X is the vector of covariates. The Cox proportional
hazard model does not make any assumptions about the
baseline hazard h04t5. Cox’s partial likelihood estimator
provides an effective way of estimating  without requir-
ing estimates of h04t5. However, the Cox proportional
hazards model assumes that the hazard rates are propor-
tional. Thus, h04t5 does not depend on the covariates
included in the model. The assumption of proportional
hazards in the Cox model was tested without evidence
of nonproportionality.
The data on the timing of top management’s attention
to technological discontinuities were discrete because
each corporation was observed annually. This led to ties
among companies in the timing of their top manage-
ment’s attention to technological discontinuities. There-
fore, we used the Efron method, which is suitable for
data with a large number of ties, but we found no sig-
nificant differences in the results compared with other
choices (Cleves et al. 2004).1 As additional robustness
tests, we reran the duration analysis using discrete-
time survival analysis (a logit model with annual year
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by firm)
and piecewise exponential models with robust standard
errors without changes in the main results.
The independent variables used in the hazard mod-
els changed over time. To accommodate time-varying
covariates, we divided the time period during which each
firm was observed into yearly spells (Tuma and Hannan
1984). All time-changing covariates were updated annu-
ally. Each annual spell was treated as right censored,
except for those spells that terminated in recognizing the
technological discontinuity. Our models assumed that
interorganizational relationships in year t−1 would lead
to formal attention by top management to discontinuities
in year t. This one-year lag also helped us to ensure
the causality of the relationship. Furthermore, for inde-
pendent variables, we calculated network measures with
two-year moving windows. Thus, to explain attention in
year t, we used relationships from t− 2 to t− 1, except
for two robustness test models, in which we tested sim-
ple one-year lagged annual measures t − 1. To account
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for the potential endogeneity of CVC activity, we esti-
mated two-stage models that predicted coinvestments
with VCs in the first stage and controlled for this in the
second stage of the model, which estimated the effects
of interorganizational ties on the timing of top manage-
ment’s attention to discontinuities.
Measures
Dependent Variables. Our primary dependent vari-
able was the timing of the formal attention to major
discontinuities by an incumbent’s top management. Fol-
lowing other studies that measured management cog-
nition for a large number of companies over a long
period of time (e.g., Barr 1998, Eggers and Kaplan
2009, Gerdes 2003, Kaplan 2008, Kaplan et al. 2003,
Osborne et al. 2001, Schnatterly 2003), we derived the
data for the dependent variable from companies’ offi-
cial reports. As a source for our primary measures, we
used companies’ annual 10-K filings with the SEC, as in
prior research (e.g., Feldman et al. 2010, Gerdes 2003,
Schnatterly 2003, Yuthas et al. 2002). Official SEC fil-
ings, such as Item 1 (Business) in annual 10-K fil-
ings, have several advantages over other types of cor-
porate documents. They are comprehensively available,
audited, and comparable across firms and over time
(Feldman et al. 2010). The comprehensive availability of
the documents is important because even a small number
of missing documents would make our time-to-attention
variable indeterminable. Other potential sources of infor-
mation, such as letters to shareholders, press releases, or
speeches by senior executives, are not available as con-
sistently for all firms in the sample. This factor excluded
the use of letters to shareholders in annual reports in the
event history models. Internal sources, such as minutes
from board meetings, though desirable, would have been
nearly impossible to obtain. Although measuring cog-
nitive constructs based on publicly available documents
has limitations (e.g., Fiol 1995, Fiss and Zajac 2006),
recent research has shown that these documents reflect
judgments about the importance of issues among senior
management. As a result, they offer reasonable prox-
ies for senior management’s attention that can be con-
structed through text analysis (Cho and Hambrick 2006,
Duriau et al. 2007, Eggers and Kaplan 2009, Kaplan
2008). In additional analyses that explained annual atten-
tion by top management using fixed effects panel regres-
sion models, we used letters to shareholders as the
source of data, with similar results. To operationalize
these measures, we used counts of mentions of the
Internet (or wireless, in other analyses) divided by the
number of words in the document (Item 1, Business in
the 10-K form in the main analyses and letter to share-
holders in additional robustness tests).
As previously stated, we examined two discontinu-
ities that substantially affected ICT companies during
the sample period 1989–2000: the Internet and wireless
technologies. Both technological discontinuities pro-
foundly affected a large number of industries, redefin-
ing how we think about information and communication
technologies (Szulanski et al. 2004, Yoffie 1997). As
with many other discontinuous technologies, Internet-
based and wireless-based businesses were first developed
by new entrepreneurial ventures (Christensen 1997). For
instance, whereas none of the sample corporations men-
tioned the Internet in their 10-K filings before 1993,
dozens of VCs had made investments in companies that
were active in developing technologies relevant for the
Internet since the 1980s, according to VentureXpert.
To determine the time when top management paid
attention to these discontinuities, we searched the annual
10-K filings of all sample companies over the entire
sample period for occurrences of terms commonly used
by top management to refer to focal discontinuities
within the “Business” section that describes the business
in the Form 10-K (Item 1). We then recorded the year
of the first mention of the discontinuity. To examine the
Internet, we focused on the phrase “the Internet,” which
consistently referred to the Internet as a discontinuity.
To validate our measure, we conducted further con-
tent analysis that included key-word-in-context (KWIC)
analyses. Although we found that a strict focus on the
the Internet in 10-K files helped to avoid false pos-
itives (such as “Internet protocol” or “internetwork-
ing,” which were used to refer to technical issues in a
small number of documents much earlier than the Inter-
net as a phenomenon was known), we also developed
broader measures based on the KWIC analysis and reran
the main model including additional words (“Internet,”
“Web,” “IP,” “on-line,” “online,” “e-commerce,” and “e-
business”) with substantially similar results.
Thus, our study’s first dependent variable was the time
when top management formally paid attention to the
Internet in a firm’s corporate documents. This was mea-
sured as the time between January 1989 (alternatively,
January 1993 in the robustness tests) and the time of
a company’s first mention of technological discontinu-
ity in its 10-K filings. We repeated this approach with
wireless technologies (e.g., WLANs) as a focal disconti-
nuity. Following the same logic we used when studying
the Internet, we identified the first mention of variations
of the term “wireless” in the 10-K filings and tested
the hypotheses with this dependent variable. To measure
top management’s attention to wireless technologies, we
considered other terms, such as “mobile” and “cellu-
lar,” but we found that the word “wireless” was the best
choice for this analysis.2
In addition to the first mentions of the focal discon-
tinuities that we used in the event history analyses, we
operationalized another dependent variable to measure
annual formal attention by top management to these
discontinuities as the relative share they received either
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in the 10-K filings or in letters to shareholders when
normalized by document length. We ran several robust-
ness tests that included alternative dependent variables
to ensure the validity and reliability of our measure-
ment approach. These tests are presented in the Results
section.
Independent Variables. The first independent variable
(H1) was homophilous interorganizational ties to peer
incumbents, measured as the number of alliances or joint
ventures with peers in the sample. To construct this vari-
able, we counted all alliances and joint ventures of a
focal firm with all other firms in our sample within the
same three-digit industry while excluding direct com-
petitors with a four-digit SIC code match.3 Our choice
of size and industry to capture partner homophily is
justified because size is an important yet easily mea-
sured criterion to evaluate a firm’s available resources.
For instance, small and medium-sized enterprises in the
same industry face very different competitive conditions
than large firms do. We further limited the alliances and
joint ventures to relationships within the same indus-
try because industry boundaries often shape the men-
tal models of a firm and its top management (Porac
et al. 1995). To test H3, we created a measure of het-
erophilous interorganizational ties by counting coinvest-
ment ties with VC firms. The idea behind this measure is
that by establishing a CVC unit that coinvests with pri-
vate VC firms, an incumbent firm could connect to the
networks of start-ups and VCs. These connections were
operationalized through syndicated investments along-
side VCs (i.e., the CVC fund in which an incumbent
is the sole limited partner coinvesting with private VCs,
thus creating links between the corporation and VC
companies and start-ups). Syndicated investments fre-
quently involve the sharing of information about start-
ups, their technologies, and the markets they are likely
to serve (Gompers and Lerner 1999, Sorenson and Stu-
art 2001). Information about emerging technologies typ-
ically reaches VC networks early (Bygrave et al. 2001,
von Burg and Kenney 2000).
To test H2 and H4 on the effects of partners’ sta-
tus in homophilous and heterophilous ties, we first cre-
ated measures for partner status in homophilous and het-
erophilous ties. To measure status in alliance networks
and VC syndication networks, respectively, we followed
Podolny (1993, 2001, 2005) in using Bonacich’s (1987)
centrality measure. The Bonacich centrality ci415 was
defined as
ci415=∑
j
4+cj5Rij1
where Rij is an element of the relational matrix R, and
each element of R is the number of companies in which
firms i and j has invested together (or alliances between
the companies, in alliance networks).  is the degree to
which the centrality of i is a function of the centralities
of other firms; it is the radius of the influence of i. If
we did not expect the VC syndication or alliance rela-
tionships of j to directly benefit i,  should be small.
We followed earlier studies and set  as three-quarters
of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of R (Podolny
1993, Sorenson and Stuart 2001).
For alliance relationships, we calculated the partners’
Bonacich’s centrality measures using the position of
every alliance partner in the full network formed by all
alliances established in the specified moving window.
In our analyses, we chose two years, but we also tested
other windows without a significant difference in results.
We then aggregated the partner measures for focal firms
by averaging across all partners with which a focal firm
had formed alliances or joint ventures in a given year.
For the CVC coinvestments with VCs, we calculated
the centrality of all VCs with which a focal firm had
coinvested in the given moving window (two years in
reported analyses, except for two reported robustness
tests with one-year windows) using the full VC syndica-
tion networks. We then averaged these values to arrive
at an aggregate value.
The results of this measurement approach appear
valid. Examining the data shows that in 1994, for
instance, Microsoft had one of the highest partner sta-
tus values in heterophilous ties in the sample based on
this measure because it coinvested with Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers (the most central private VC in our
data that year) and other top-tier VCs.
Control Variables. The analyses also included sev-
eral firm- and industry-related control variables. We con-
trolled for top management’s future orientation based
on a text analysis of letters to shareholders or 10-K fil-
ings, following the operationalization of Yadav et al.
(2007), based on the use of the wording “will” in those
documents. Top management’s future orientation could
influence both the attention they paid to discontinuities
and the tools they used to facilitate timely attention
(e.g., CVC).
We also captured incumbents’ investments in R&D as
a measure of how much weight companies gave to tech-
nology and innovation issues. To separate R&D effects
from company size effects, we used R&D intensity (i.e.,
the firm’s R&D expenditure divided by its annual sales)
instead of using R&D expenditure directly.
We further controlled for firm size and profitability.
We measured company size as the logarithm of a com-
pany’s annual revenues (in millions of U.S. dollars),
derived from Compustat. Size may influence the timing
of senior executives’ attention to technological disconti-
nuities because larger firms may have formal, dedicated
units to follow such changes. Profitability was measured
as the return on assets (ROA) because past performance
might influence a company’s environmental scanning
and CVC investments.
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In addition to these firm-level controls, we controlled
for industry differences by dummy coding a firm’s
industry by its three-digit SIC classification. Dummy
codes were developed for the SIC 366 (communi-
cations equipment), SIC 367 (electronic components
and accessories), and SIC 737 (computer programming,
data processing, etc.) sectors. SIC 357 (computer and
office equipment) served as the reference industry class.
Finally, in the duration models, the piecewise con-
stant proportional hazards specification of the models
controlled for the increasing adoption of the Internet
over time by changing annual baseline hazard rates.
In discrete-time duration analyses that we ran as robust-
ness tests and in fixed effects panel regressions, we
applied year dummies. We lagged time-varying indepen-
dent and control variables by one year to reduce the risk
of reverse causality.
Results
Table 1 presents the correlations and descriptive statistics
for the study’s variables. As the data in Table 1 show,
the correlations between the independent and the control
variables were low to moderate. Variance inflation fac-
tor statistics were also low (below 2) in comparison to
the typically used threshold of 10, suggesting that mul-
ticollinearity was not a problem in our analysis.
We used event history analyses to test the hypothe-
sized relationships between interorganizational relation-
ships and the timing of top management’s attention to
discontinuities. Model 1 in Table 2 reports the base
model using Cox proportional hazards regression to
explain the time-to-attention to the Internet. Only the
communications equipment industry dummy was weakly
significant (negative). Other control variables were not
significant. Model 1, like all other models, included the
inverse Mill’s ratio that is used to control for the poten-
tial endogeneity of CVC investments syndicated with
VCs.4 This ratio was also not significant.
Hypotheses 1 and 3 are tested first in Model 2,
with the first mention of the Internet as the dependent
variable. Hypothesis 1 predicted that focal firms’ het-
erophilous ties to peer incumbents would have a negative
effect on top management’s timely attention to techno-
logical discontinuities. As noted in Model 2, the coeffi-
cient for homophilous ties is negative but insignificant.
These results failed to support our hypothesis. Addition-
ally, the results concerning H3, which predicted a pos-
itive effect on heterophilous interorganizational ties to
VCs, failed to provide support for the hypothesis.
Model 3 is similar to Model 2 but adds the partner
status measures for H2 and H4. Concerning the pre-
dicted negative effect for partner status in homophilous
interorganizational ties in H2, the coefficient is insignif-
icant. Hypothesis 4, which predicted a positive relation
between partner status in heterophilous interorganiza-
tional ties and timely attention by top management to Ta
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discontinuities, received strong support; the partner sta-
tus measure is positive and significant.
In Model 4, we sought to ensure that our findings were
not influenced by the varying importance of the Inter-
net for our sample companies because some companies
did not recognize the Internet in their 10-K filings dur-
ing the sample period (these companies mostly exited
from the sample before the end of the period because
they had been acquired by or merged with another com-
pany or defaulted). Consequently, in Model 4, we lim-
ited the sample to incumbent companies that, at some
point during the time period, recognized the Internet in
their 10-K filings. The main results of Model 3 remained
strong when the analysis was limited to this subset of
companies. In additional unreported robustness analyses,
we replicated Model 4 using a discrete-time compet-
ing risks model in which we identified firms that had
exited our sample before the right censoring in 2000
without recognizing the Internet in their filings (usually
by being acquired or after ceasing operations because of
poor performance). The main results remained strong,
but homophilous ties increased the hazard of exit from
our sample (i.e., increased the risk of business failure).
In unreported robustness tests, we ran a discrete-time
duration model with self-selection correction (equivalent
to Model 3). The results were qualitatively similar to
those obtained in Model 3, reaffirming the robustness of
our finding that the status of partners in heterophilous
ties is important. Furthermore, we ran a piecewise expo-
nential model and obtained similar results. In Model 5,
we repeated Model 4 using only one-year lagged annual
network measures instead of a two-year moving window
to focus the analyses on very recent network ties that are
likely to be particularly relevant for learning about dis-
continuities. The results were similar to those reported.
To ensure that our results were robust across differ-
ent ways of defining and measuring top management’s
attention to discontinuities, we devised another opera-
tionalization based on annual weighted counts of men-
tions in 10-K filings. This is a common measurement
approach in other empirical research on the attention-
based view when attention is used as an independent
variable explaining organizational responses (Eggers and
Kaplan 2009, Kaplan 2008, Kaplan et al. 2003). How-
ever, it should be noted that this continuous measure
of the strength of attention is conceptually quite differ-
ent from our hypotheses and primary analyses focusing
on the time to attention. Therefore, we consider this
complementary evidence. Model 6 in Table 2 reports
our results using a fixed effects panel regression that
explains the relative frequency of mentions of the Inter-
net in 10-K filings. This model shows that the status of
partners in heterophilous ties has positive and signifi-
cant coefficients, supporting H4. Other hypotheses are
not supported, although the coefficient for H1 is in the
hypothesized direction. These results are consistent with
those obtained in the event history models. Furthermore,
increasing our confidence in the main finding about the
positive effect of partner status in heterophilous ties
on top management’s attention to discontinuities, we
observed the same result also when operationalizing the
measure using letters to shareholders instead of 10-K
files in unreported robustness analyses.
As explained in the Methods section, to help gen-
eralize our findings and to ensure that these findings
are not idiosyncratic to one particular discontinuity, we
considered another important discontinuity in the ICT
sector, wireless technologies. The results reported in
Models 7–12 were similar to and supportive of our main
findings based on time-to-attention to the Internet. How-
ever, one qualitative difference in the results was that H1
received support in Model 11. Although the results were
very similar, we consider the Internet the primary setting
for our hypotheses because wireless technology was a
less significant discontinuity than the Internet was during
this time period. For instance, the adoption of wireless
technologies occurred over a significantly longer period
of time, with some companies paying attention to wire-
less in 1989–1990 but fewer companies paying attention
to it at the end of the sample period. Thus, wireless tech-
nology is a secondary setting for our hypothesis tests.
Our analyses suggested that homophilous ties did not
consistently have the expected significant negative effect
on timely attention to discontinuities by top manage-
ment. Therefore, we decided to further explore this rela-
tionship. Because the firms in our sample gradually paid
increasing attention to the Internet and wireless tech-
nologies, one possible explanation for the lack of signif-
icance might be the changing effect of peer incumbents
over time. In the beginning, when peer companies do
not pay attention to emerging discontinuities, they may
be expected to have an inertial negative effect. However,
as incumbents increase their attention to the disconti-
nuity, they may become advocates of this discontinuity,
and their influence on other incumbents that have not
paid formal attention to the discontinuity might change.
In fact, once the top management of peer incumbent
firms have paid attention, it is difficult to argue that they
would continue to have an inertial effect. Instead, their
effect could become positive from the perspective of a
focal company that has not yet paid attention. Conse-
quently, we ran an unreported post hoc analysis of this
potential explanation by dividing annual homophilous
ties based on whether the top management of the part-
ner incumbent paid attention to the discontinuity. In the
panel data analysis in the Internet case, we found that
before the partner had paid attention, the effect was
negative, and after the partner had paid attention, the
ties had a positive effect, which weakly supports H1.
We consider this finding interesting and a logical par-
tial explanation for our insignificant results in the pri-
mary tests of H1. At the same time, we note that the
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evidence is quite weak and not replicable in our event
history analyses or in the wireless case. A proper test
of the moderating effect of peer attention on the effect
of homophilous ties would require a different research
setting that includes controls for other channels (e.g.,
competitor intelligence) through which incumbents learn
from each other.
Discussion
In this study, we aimed to examine the role of different
types of interorganizational ties and the status of part-
ners within these ties as structural antecedents of top
management’s attention to emerging technological dis-
continuities. We tested our hypotheses in a longitudinal
study of the incumbents in four information and commu-
nications technology industry sectors, examining their
ties in full alliance and VC networks. We found that the
status of partners in heterophilous ties formed through
coinvestments with high-status VC firms was a signifi-
cant predictor of timely attention to such discontinuities
by top management. Homophilous ties did not have a
consistently significant effect, but our ex post analysis
suggested that this result might be due to the changing
effects of peers when their top management begins to
pay attention to a given discontinuity. Our findings con-
tribute to several bodies of literature, as discussed next.
Technological Discontinuities and
Top Management’s Attention
A growing body of research on technological disconti-
nuities highlights the role of the attention of incumbent
firms’ top managers in responding to discontinuous tech-
nological change (e.g., Barr 1998, Kaplan 2008, Kaplan
and Tripsas 2008, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, Virany
et al. 1992). For instance, in work on discontinuities in
fiber optics and pharmaceuticals, Kaplan and colleagues
(Eggers and Kaplan 2009, Kaplan 2008, Kaplan et al.
2003) have shown that top management’s attention pre-
dicts effective firm responses. By interpreting changes
in the external environment and formulating (or at least
orchestrating the formulation of) appropriate and timely
responses, top managers can shape a firm’s strategy.
However, prior studies have not addressed the question
of why top managers in some firms pay attention to these
discontinuities whereas top managers in other companies
do not.
Prior research has explained the failure to pay atten-
tion to discontinuities largely by invoking cognitive
and incentive factors that work against timely atten-
tion by top management to technological discontinuities.
These discontinuities are often based on knowledge
that is distant from the incumbents’ existing knowl-
edge base (Kaplan and Tripsas 2008) and therefore
may lead to business models that directly contradict the
experience of a firm’s senior executives (Tripsas and
Gavetti 2000). In some cases, technological discontinu-
ities may also run counter to deeply held beliefs within
the firm that form the organization’s identity (Tripsas
2009). As a result, environmental cues about these dis-
continuities are easily misinterpreted by top management
(Barr 1998, Porac et al. 1995, Reger and Palmer 1996,
Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Furthermore, top manage-
ment frequently has personal incentives to not embrace
such discontinuities because of the risks of investing in
unproven new technologies (Kaplan 2008, Kaplan and
Henderson 2005).
Our results suggest that some of the interorga-
nizational relationships in which incumbents engage
can play a crucial role in guiding their top manage-
ment’s attention to technological discontinuities. Indeed,
we find that heterophilous ties with high-status part-
ners through coinvestments with high-status VCs pos-
itively affect top managers’ timely attention, whereas
homophilous interorganizational relationships do not
have a significant impact in this regard. These results
extend prior arguments in the social network litera-
ture that posit that access to diverse sources of infor-
mation should be positively related to the ability to
adapt to environmental change (Koka and Prescott 2008,
Lee 2007). Our results suggest that in addition to the
diversity of the information sources, the status of an
information source plays an important role because
knowledge and information from these sources carry dif-
ferent weights with corporate decision makers. The high
status of partners in heterophilous ties, such as syndica-
tion with high-status VCs, may increase the credibility
that top managers attach to information from these ties.
Attention-Based View of the Firm
Our results also contribute to the attention-based view
of the firm. In particular, the literature on the attention-
based view has noted the importance of structural deter-
minants of organizational attention. For instance, Ocasio
(1997) argues that the rules of the game, resources, play-
ers, and social positions within the firm generate a set
of values that order the legitimacy, importance, and rele-
vance of issues and possible organizational responses to
these issues. However, prior theorizing in the attention-
based view has been largely restricted to structures
within organizations. Our study extends this research
by emphasizing structures outside of a firm’s bound-
aries that might influence top management’s attention.
Our core finding—that heterophilous interorganizational
relationships with high-status partners affect top man-
agement’s attention to technological discontinuities—
suggests that such structures can play an important role
in shaping attention patterns. As a result, theorizing
within the attention-based view should be extended to
include structures beyond the boundaries of the firm.
Decision makers in organizations are embedded in multi-
ple interorganizational structures that may influence their
attention patterns.
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Our core finding further suggests a theoretical link
between the literature on attention and the literature on
status, which warrants additional theoretical and empir-
ical work. Status and status expectations influence rela-
tionship formation across organizations (Chung et al.
2000) and are central to intraorganizational group forma-
tion processes (Ruef et al. 2003) and interactions during
task performance (Ridgeway 2001) within these groups.
In the context of the present study, status expecta-
tions may influence how executives in high-status indus-
trial corporations relate to high-status or low-status VCs
with whom their firm coinvests and, consequently, how
they evaluate information from these VCs. Although
our empirical results are limited to the effects of status
within heterogeneous interorganizational relationships,
status differentials may be important theoretical expla-
nations for attention allocation processes in intraorga-
nizational contexts. Status expectations may shape the
structures that affect attention allocation and may have
important effects on interaction patterns within intraor-
ganizational social structures.
The link identified in this study between status and
attention may also shed light on bottom-up attention pro-
cesses (Ocasio 2011). The decision makers in the firms
we studied are faced with an ecology of information
regarding new technologies that compete for attention.
Given the uncertainty regarding these technologies, deci-
sion makers sometimes find it difficult to evaluate this
information based on its quality (Podolny 1993, 1994;
Podolny 2001) and may therefore revert to the status of
the sources to determine the salience of the information.
In this view, status moderates bottom-up processes of
attention allocation.
In our empirical analyses, we failed to find consis-
tent support for the hypothesized effects of homophilous
relationships. However, our post hoc analysis, which
divided homophilous relationships into those with part-
ners that paid attention to discontinuity and those that
did not pay attention to discontinuity, suggests that situa-
tional factors (in this case, the fact that a partner had paid
attention to the discontinuity) may interact with struc-
tures that guide attention allocation. Although tentative
given the limitations of our data, this finding suggests the
need to further explore how the interaction of structural
and situational factors could affect attention allocation
processes.
Our findings further contribute to recent research on
attention to rare events (Rerup 2009, Weick and Sutcliffe
2006). This research has argued that maintaining suffi-
cient quality of attention to emerging rare events is chal-
lenging, particularly in light of short-term pressures that
arise from ongoing routine activities that may exhaust
organizational attention structures (Levinthal and Rerup
2006, Salvato 2009). Regular, focused discussions with
a select group of high-status VCs may create a context
in which top managers’ attention focuses on rare events,
freeing discussions from the short-term pressures of rou-
tine business development and allowing them to focus on
emerging technologies and business models. These reg-
ular discussions can increase the quality of attention and
facilitate mindful exploration of potential discontinuities
by the top management team (Ocasio 2011, Salvato
2009). By regularly interacting with high-status VCs, top
managers may create a mechanism that routinizes the
mindful exploration of weak signals and allows them
to overcome the trade-off between routine and mindful
behavior (Levinthal and Rerup 2006, Salvato 2009).
Interorganizational Networks
Our analyses offer a fine-grained picture of the roles
of network structure and network composition in social
networks. Scholars generally agree that, under most cir-
cumstances, social networks formed through interorga-
nizational relationships provide benefits to the focal firm
(Burt 1992, Coleman 1988, Podolny and Stuart 1995,
Powell et al. 1996). However, there is a debate about
the type of network that provides the most benefits. This
debate has focused on the structures of various networks,
emphasizing the different benefits derived from sparse
and dense networks (Burt 1992, Coleman 1988, Lee
2007) and largely ignoring the differences among the
firms with which a focal firm connects in a network.
A considerable amount of prior literature on social
networks has viewed (or, at least, empirically treated)
all nodes in a network as equal. However, some
researchers have recently underscored the importance
of network composition in explaining the different
effects of networks to which a focal firm is connected
(Lee 2008). Our finding that heterophilous ties through
coinvestments with high-status VCs have a consistently
significant positive effect on timely attention by top
management, whereas homophilous interorganizational
ties through alliances to industry peers have no such
univocal effect, further emphasizes the importance of
network composition. Our analysis of full alliance and
VC syndication networks suggests that treating all nodes
in a network as equal or focusing solely on network
structure can lead to inconclusive or even misleading
results. In particular, the inconclusive finding regarding
homophilous ties is interesting. Our post hoc analysis
suggests that homophilous ties seem to have initial iner-
tial effects, whereas these ties seem to have positive
effects when partner firms pay attention to discontinuity.
This finding, albeit tentative, suggests that some effects
of social networks are likely to be dependent on dif-
ferences across nodes that may not be fully captured
by network structure measures. The results also suggest
that treating all interorganizational relationships as one
social network in which the firm is embedded may over-
simplify reality and mask some of the effects of social
networks. Future theorizing would benefit from distin-
guishing between the multiple networks to which a firm
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is connected. Different networks serve different purposes
and consist of different types of actors, which may have
different effects on the focal firm. Such fine-grained the-
orizing will create more realistic models of how social
networks influence firm behavior and its outcomes.
Corporate Venture Capital
Our results contribute to the literature on the role of
CVC in the corporate innovation process. Although
it is somewhat cyclical in volume, CVC investing has
become an integral tool of corporate innovation activities
(Dushnitsky 2006, Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a). Prior
research on CVC investments has examined the potential
learning benefits of these investments (Dushnitsky and
Lenox 2005b, Dushnitsky and Shaver 2009, Schildt et al.
2005, Wadhwa and Kotha 2006). Early research has
explored the effect of CVC investments on innovation
rates (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005b) and on exploratory
knowledge creation and learning (Schildt et al. 2005,
Wadhwa and Kotha 2006) by linking these investments
to patenting rates. More recently, studies have pointed to
the limits of knowledge transfer between start-ups and
incumbents (Dushnitsky and Shaver 2009), suggesting
that incumbents’ CVC investments might fail in circum-
stances where learning might be most valuable for the
incumbent. Overall, these findings question the impor-
tance of CVC for corporate innovation.
Our study contributes to this debate by showing that
the role of CVC activities in corporate innovation might
be related less to transferring patentable knowledge to
the parent firm and more to directing top management’s
attention to major changes in the firm’s environment.
CVC can thus be viewed as radar that identifies and
highlights emerging technologies and new businesses
(Dushnitsky and Lenox 2006, Keil et al. 2008a, Siegel
et al. 1988). As such, CVC investments can significantly
influence the cognizance of business opportunities and
related business models among CVC managers and top
managers. Even when an incumbent does not transfer
a specific technology that a start-up can commercial-
ize, CVC investments may provide important insights
into the evolution of a technological field. Informa-
tion received from CVC investments may also influ-
ence how senior executives think about the likelihood
that a technological area will become important for the
incumbent. These higher-level learning processes are not
always influenced by the individual start-ups in which
the incumbent invests. Instead, they are shaped by the
information CVCs receive in the process of screening
ventures together with high-status VCs and the portfolio
of deal proposals they process for investment purposes
together with syndicating VCs. For instance, although
Microsoft did not directly invest in the first Internet
start-ups in 1994, its top-tier coinvestor, Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers, was a lead investor in pioneering
Internet start-ups such as Netscape in early 1994. Among
the incumbent firms in our sample, Microsoft was one
of the early companies to pay attention to the Inter-
net, with the Internet clearly identified as a key business
driver in the letter to shareholders of its 1995 annual
report. Although coinvestment relationships of corpo-
rations in CVC investments with high-status VC firms
may not necessarily create direct knowledge flows about
the VCs’ other portfolio companies, emerging business
opportunities and start-ups in which high-status fellow
board members or their VC partnerships are publicly
investing are likely to receive more attention by fel-
low board members than are other start-ups of similar
size or potential business opportunities of similar uncer-
tainty. Among corporate tools for recognizing discontin-
uous technological change, a large number of indirect
ties to promising VC-backed start-ups through coinvest-
ments with top-tier VCs is a unique feature of coinvested
CVC investments compared with other interorganiza-
tional relationships.
Given our results, it is reasonable to ask why CVC
investment, a corporate activity that is often relatively
small in scale and detached from the core business,
plays such an important role in influencing senior man-
agement’s cognition. One explanation can be found
in the theory of knowledge brokers (Hargadon and
Sutton 1997, Hargadon 2002). CVC managers are often
uniquely positioned to participate in both the corporate
environment and the start-up and VC communities (Keil
et al. 2008a). By operating in both environments simul-
taneously, CVC managers are well positioned to act as
knowledge brokers who mediate and address cognitive
conflicts that arise between the cognitive frameworks
of existing business unit managers and frameworks
related to technological discontinuity. Overall, our anal-
yses show that CVC activities may play a unique role
by providing a window on technological discontinuities.
Managerial Implications
Our results have several implications for managerial
practice. They suggest that to avoid being trapped in
the innovator’s dilemma (Christensen 1997, Rosenbloom
and Christensen 1994), incumbents must develop rela-
tionships that can direct their top management’s atten-
tion to these discontinuities. The results emphasize that
incumbents can create a radar for technological discon-
tinuities by actively using syndicated CVC investments
with top-tier VCs to monitor emerging developments
in start-up networks. Technologies developed by start-
ups are often the forerunners of technological shifts in
an industry. Building relationships to such start-ups and
the investors that fund them can direct top managers’
attention to technological discontinuities. However, the
effectiveness of this tool depends on an incumbent’s
ability to coinvest with the highest-status VCs. Conse-
quently, incumbents need to structure their investment
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activities in ways that enable cooperation with high-
status VCs. Executives must think strategically about
their CVC activities by setting clear investment goals.
For instance, executives must identify the types of tech-
nological trends their companies should follow and how
to best position their companies in VC networks to fol-
low these trends.
When considering the costs and benefits of CVC
for corporations, it is worth noting that although CVC
requires capital to be committed, each investment in a
syndicate with independent VCs should have a positive
risk-adjusted return expectation as a stand-alone invest-
ment. With a long-term commitment to CVC investment
activity, the strategic benefits gained from these invest-
ments should be relatively cheaper in comparison to cor-
responding benefits from R&D expenditures and other
activities that create direct expenses.
Limitations
Our study has limitations that should be recognized
when interpreting its results. Specifically, our measure-
ment approach forces us to abstract from the interpre-
tative processes in which top managers engage as they
address technological change in their environment (Lant
and Shapira 2001). However, the approach we have fol-
lowed is in line with similar studies that measure cog-
nitive constructs across a large number of organizations
over a long period of time. A word count-based mea-
sure might be one of the few ways to capture issues
of managerial cognition in large sample studies (Eggers
and Kaplan 2009, Kaplan 2008).
Because we construct our attention measure using let-
ters to shareholders and 10-K reports, we are unable to
measure valence as an opportunity or threat or to mea-
sure the specific nature of the understanding. Although
valence and specific understanding would be of theoret-
ical interest, the methods we use have been found to
be significantly weak in assessing such constructs (Fiol
1995). Therefore, we must leave the issue of valence to
future research.
Our sample was drawn from four information and
communications technology industry sectors, providing
an interesting setting in which to examine a technolog-
ical discontinuity such as the Internet. Companies in
these industries are expected to be well positioned to
recognize the strategic importance of the Internet (and
wireless technologies in the robustness analysis). Our
industry choice enabled us to select a sample of firms
that were similarly affected by the same discontinu-
ities. Because industries differ in their knowledge bases
as well as in their rate and sources of technological
change and because the evolutionary paths of technolo-
gies might differ, the results may not apply to other
industries. Thus, constructive replications of our study
in other industry settings and for other technologies may
yield a richer understanding of how CVC investments
can support incumbents’ early recognition of technolog-
ical discontinuities.
A final limitation concerns our approach to measur-
ing the networks in which our focal firms were embed-
ded. To make the analysis manageable, our analysis
of network structures focused exclusively on direct ties
and partners’ status in alliance and VC networks while
ignoring information flows through indirect ties. Future
research should explore the effects of such indirect ties
in data sets that are smaller in size and therefore more
manageable.
Directions for Future Research
Our results highlight several avenues for future research.
Future researchers should study different network com-
positions in more detail and should develop a more
detailed picture of the effects of the multiple social net-
works in which an incumbent is embedded. Although
we were able to distinguish between peer alliances and
CVC coinvestments with high-status VCs, other dis-
tinctions can be made and should be incorporated into
future social network studies. Researchers should also
explore the time-varying effects of peer alliances that we
identified.
Our results suggest that external structural determi-
nants are an important factor in guiding organizational
attention to environmental events. Future research could
analyze the role of other external determinants of man-
agement attention, such as research consortia, trade
associations, or board interlocks. Future research would
benefit also from investigating how internal and external
determinants interact to shape organizational attention.
This research would not only advance understanding of
attention structures but would also provide important
findings for the design of organizational issue manage-
ment systems.
Our findings highlight a need for more fine-grained
research into the processes used by incumbents to cap-
ture knowledge and information from CVC investments
and the deals they screen. The ways that incumbents
gather, analyze, and interpret information about pending
technological changes are issues worthy of investigation.
The systems and processes that incumbents employ for
these purposes also require further study. It is essen-
tial to investigate the processes that incumbents employ
to make effective use of information in designing their
strategies. A related issue for future research involves
the different mechanisms incumbents apply to identify
technological discontinuities.
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Endnotes
1We also reran the analyses using as an alternative, the
Breslow method, which is the default in Stata (but theoreti-
cally less suitable for our situation) and obtained qualitatively
similar results for the hypothesized relationships.
2We found that the word “wireless” was commonly used to
refer to the new phenomenon (e.g., DSC Communications in
a December 1990 10-K filing: “0 0 0will allow the Company
to provide a new group of products to both the current cel-
lular marketplace and the emerging wireless communications
market” (DSC Communications 1990); and Oracle in a May
1995 10-K filing: “The networks can range from local and
wide area networks to ISDN, Internet, broadband and wire-
less” (Oracle 1995)). In contrast, “mobile” was used for many
other purposes, such as referring to mobile users who could
log in to wired networks in remote locations (e.g., 3Com in a
May 1995 10-K filing: “3Com’s AccessBuilder remote access
servers give these mobile users simplified analog or digital
(ISDN) dial-up access to the network”; see 3Com 1995).
3We also reran the analyses without this limitation in the same
industry to test the effects of the industry limitation on the
effects of alliances with incumbents without significant differ-
ences in the results.
4In the selection model, we estimated the inverse Mill’s ratio
based on a probit model explaining whether the focal com-
pany engaged in syndicated CVC investments in a particular
year. The independent variables included top management’s
future orientation 4t− 15, sales (logged, t− 1), R&D intensity
4t − 15, a dummy for missing R&D data 4t − 15, return on
assets (ROA, t − 1), whether the focal company engaged in
syndicated CVC investments in the previous period, year dum-
mies, and industry dummies. Of these variables, sales, R&D
intensity, ROA, and past CVC activity were all positive and
significant. Additionally, some of the year and industry dum-
mies were significant.
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